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ABSTRACT 
The financing of local public goods in French communities can be 
viewed, until 1980, as a one dimensional choice. We propose a model to 
formalize this choice which results in the best choice of the "median" agent 
in a population in Which two types of citizens have been distinguished. 
Those who pay and those who do not pay the "taxe professionnelle". A 
translog specification of the model is estimated using data about 36 
communities near the city of Toulouse, France. The democratic hypothesis 
according to which both types of agents mentionned above have the same 
weight in the decision process is rejected. Moreover, we do not reject the 
hypothesis that this non democratic bias decreases with the size of the city. 
I .Introduction 
The decision processes used in the provision of local public goods are 
in general very complex given the various forms of financing and the 
number of goods involved. However, the political-economic theory available 
for empirical research is basically reduced to the median agent-paradigm I 
which requires both the unidimensionality of decisions and single peaked 
preferences. 
Curiously enough, it happens that the methods of financing local 
public goods used in French communities until 1980 can be, despite their 
apparent complexity, assimilated to unidimensional decisions. Even though 
four different taies were used, the structure of these taxes were fixed by 
law so that only a general level had to be chosen by the community2. 
Decisions are not taken by direct voting as in some countries, but by 
the council of the community which is democratically elected : If citizens· 
preferences are single peaked we can postulate the assumption that the 
I See Bowen (1943). Black (1948). Downs (1�7l. Com.anor (1976) and Romer and 
Rosenthal 0979) for the theory and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). Inman (1978). 
Holcombe.( 1980) a.nd Gramlich a.nd Rubinfeld ( 1982) for empirical implement&tions. 
2 We are not concerned here with the allocation of this budget among the different 
types of local npendiWres. We make the assumption that this imputation does not 
influence the choice of the budget's amount. This could be the case for example if 
the detailed choice of public goods was made by the median a.gent (or the 
generalized median agent of this paper> with Cobb-Douglas preferences across local 
public goods 
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decision taken by the council is as if it corresponded to the best choice of 
the median agent. We pursue this line of research in this paper. However. 
two types of agents must be distinguished, those who only pay taxes on 
their housing expenses and those who. in addition, have a professional 
activity requiring the payment of the "ta.xe professionnelle" (a trade income 
tax). With respect to these categories, two observations are in order. First it 
is acknowledged that communities do make efforts to attract firms on their 
area . Second, trade income tu payers constitute a small and usually well 
informed group able to influence other groups' choices. From these 
observations one can suspect that the trade income tax payers group has a 
larger weight than its demographic weight in the decisions about public 
goods. Moreover this overweight might be greater in small communities 
than in large ones. Indeed in small communities notabilities often play a 
leading role and such neighbouring communities are competing with each 
other when seeking after firms whereas the larger ones do not face this 
problem to the same extent. 
French local taxes are described in section2. In section 3 we provide a 
model of preferences implying indirect utility functions which are single 
peaked simultaneously for both types of agents. We then assume that 
decisions are the outcome of a weighted majority rule in which the tw,o 
types of agents have different weights. Section 4 describes the econometric 
model we derive from this theory and the estimation method we use. We 
test two types of hypotheses within this theory : first. the democratic 
assumption that both types have the same weight against the alternative 
that the voting procedure is a weighted majority rule. second that the non 
democratic bias decreases with the size of the community. Section 4 
describes the various sets of data we need to undertake the tests. Results 
are given in section S. Technicalities are relegated in appendices and a few 
concluding comments are offered in section 6. 
2. French LocaJ Tues
Public goods are mainly provided at four levels : state, regions (22), 
departments ( l 0 l ), communes (3640 0 ). In the budget of a community 
appear two types of eipenses (current eipenses and investment) which are 
balanced by four kinds of resources : Subsidies from superior levels (on 
average 36 \ in 1981), loans (IS \), local taxes (34 \), other resources 
among which mainly tariffs for special local public goods for which 
exclusion of use is easy (supply of water. swimming pools .. .). 
4 
There are four main local ta1es : The "ta:1e d'habitation" which is 
coUected from households and is based on a vatue of their dwelling ca1led 
the "valeur locative". This value has been determined administratively in 
1973 for the last time and is now actualised each year by multiplying with 
a coefficient provided nationally. The "taie fonciere sur !es proprietes 
b:Wes" which is co11ected from owners of houses. It is a property tai based 
on a value of houses, called the "revenu cadastral", which is half the sum of 
the "valeurs locatives" of the dwellings composing the house. The "taxe 
fonciere sur !es proprietes non Mties" which is co11ected from owners of 
non constructed pieces of land and is based on their values. The "taxe 
professionne11e" which is co11ected from corporate and uncorporate firms 
and is based on the value of their productive capital and, according to 
activities, on wages paid or sales. 
There are other specific taxes, such as a tax on mines, a tax on 
electricity ... which represent Jess than 9 \ of the budget in cities of more 
than IO 000 inhabitants and that we Include here in non fiscal resources. 
Until 1980, a single decision was ta.ken to fix the rates of the four main 
taies, as fo11ows : The local assembly decided the level of total e1penditures 
and, taking into account other resources, it derived the total proceeds 
needed from those taies. This total amount was divided into four parts 
corresponding to the four taies, using predetermined coefficients setting 
the fiscal burdens of the four categories of tax-payers. Roughly, the 
coefficients were such that the share of each tax payer group remained 
what it would have been with the 1917 tax-rates and the actual basis. 
Finally, the rates of taxes to be applied to each tax payer's fiscal bases were 
determined by dividing each part by the total basis of the tax. 
So until 1980 and also for some communities in 19811, the ordinary 
budget of a city can be written : 
z 
= 
h Bh + f Br + g Bg + t Bt + T 
where h, f, g, t are the four tax rates, Bh, Br , Bg , Bt are the four 
corresponding tax bases and T is the total of the other ordinary resources. 
T being assumed predetermined, the vote on z is a vote on (h Bh + f 
Br + g Bg + t Btl which, as seen before, can be written : 
I Cities vhich chose to keep a proportional grovlh of lhe four tu-rates. 
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where K is a constant since the relative shares of each tax-payer group are 
fixed. Thus, Bh being exogenous, the vote on z turns out to be a vote on h 
(one of the four tax rates) and z can be vritten: 
Z =hB+T 
where 
In fact. in our study. we take : 
r Br � t Bt B
= 
( 1 +0.38) Bh( 1 + h Bh 
+ h Bh ) + Bh h Bh
where t refers to the "ta1e proressionnelle", because one of the subsidies 
received by the city is proportional to the amount or taxes collected from 
households (0.38 F of subsidy for 1 F of such taxes). 
As the sample refers only to urban communities the "taxe fonciere sur 
!es proprietes non baties" is neglected. There is a final difficulty due to the 
fact that the "taxe fonciere sur les proprietes bilties" is payed by owners 
and it is not clear to which extent it is transferred to renters. We will take 
the two extreme. attitudes of including it in the other resources of the 
community and of assuming that it is entirely transferred. We get in this 
r f 
case : z = h Br + z Br+ t Bt + T 
= 
( h + zl Br+ t Bt + T = h' B' + T. In every
expression, Including II, h is then replaced by h' . The results appear robust 
to these changes of specification. 
3.Tbe Model 
Let us consider a consumer i in an economy with L private goods 
. L 
and one public good. Let x• E R + be his consumption of private goods 
and z E R + his consumption of public good. Let p E R 
L 
+ the price 
vector of private goods and Ri consumer i' s income. 
We define consumer i's semi indirect utility function yi {p, Ri, z) as: 
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vi (p, Ri, z) = max Ui ( 1i , z)
S.T. p . 1i i Ri 
Using standard arguments (see Varian ( 1978)) we can show that vi 
is continuous. decreasing in p, increasing in Ri , strictly quasi-convex in p, 
homogeneous or degree o in ( p, Ri ) and from our assumptions it is 
strictly quasi-concave in z .  
In our work we assume that there are only two private goods. the 
numeraire which represents an aggregate of private goods and housing. 
Housing is measured by an aggregate of characteristics and let us denote 
p E R + its price. 
For the econometric implementation, we postulate a translog family 
of semi indirect utility functions such that : 
Log yi - 01 Log p+ 02 Log Ri •
I 2 . . . z ( P 11 ( Log p ) + 2 p 12 Log p Log Rt + P 22 ( Log Rt )2 J 
1 
+ y t Log z + 2 y 2 (Log z )2
We wish to use the median-voter paradigm to determine the chosen 
level of the tai:. However, we must distinguish two types of agents. First, we 
have the citizens who pay only tai:es on housing, type l agents. In 
community j, they face a price of housing! 
(I +hi ) pi . 
The total budget of community j used to finance local public goods is 
(see appendix I )  :
where 
zi hi Bi + Ti 
hi is the rate of housing tax in community j, 
Bi is the generalized basis of the tax in community j, 
Ti are other incomes of community i-
1 ror one of these egents living in rommunity j an<! vhose bowing hose. surfe.<:e of s, 
the �t of the p.ub1fo good 1� hi pi�-
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The semi indirect utility function of an agent i of type I is : 
Log vi= OJ Log(! +hiJpi+a2Log Ri +i( P 11 (Log( l  +hi)pi)2 + 2P12 Log(! +hilpi Log Ri•
p22 ( Log Ri )2 I 
. . . I 
+ )' t Log (h J BJ+ T J) + z )'Z (Log (hi B i+ T i))2
Agents of type 2 pay in addition to housing taxes the "taxe 
professionnelle" that we assimilate 1 to an income tax at the rate Si hi. The 
semi indirect utility function of an agent i of type 2 is z: 
Log yi • o t Log ( 1 + h i) pi +oz Log (I - Iii h.i) RL 
i( P 11(Log ( l•hi)pi)2 •2P 12 Log( l+hi)pi Log( l-lli hi Ri• 
P22 ( Log (I - Iii hi ) Ri )2 l
• y 1 Log (hi B i  +Ti)+ t y 2 (Log (hi B i + T i))2
We next assume that in each community j the level hi is 
determined by a weighted majority rule. We wm impose conditions on the 
parameters such that the objective functions of both types of agents are 
single peaked in hi 3 . Then. we know that the weighted majority rule 
yields a well defined social choice decision -4 corresponding to the choice of 
the generalized median voter. 
I The "tue professionnelle" is actually rather complex but it is legitimate as a first 
approximation to treat it as a tax on income (see appendix I and the section on data) .. 
2 For one of these agents living in community j, vhose housing has a surface of s. 
and vhose income is R , the cost of the public good is: hi pis+ hi 61 R. 
3 In a first step we imposed constraints on the coefficients ensuring single 
pea.t.edness. Later ve discovered that singlepe&t.edness vas automatically achieved 
from unconstrained estimations. The results given belov are those obtained without 
such constraints. 
1 See Moulin 0980). 
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To be able to identify this agent we need a monotonic relationship1 
between incomes and desired tax levels for both types of agents. It turns 
out that the simple constraint pzz = 0 produces the desired result (see 
appendix I). We will impose this restriction below. Let R = R I (h) this 
relationship for a type I agent and R = Rz(h) the relationship for a type 2 
agent. 
Let us call N\ and N� respectively the sizes of type I and type 2
populations in community j, and 11l(R), g�(R) the density functions of
income distributions for type I and type 2 agents in city j. 
Then, the level h"i of tu determined by weighted majority in which 
a type I agent has one vote and a type 2 agent m votes is obtained from 
the equation : 
(I) 
N i I
Rz(h"i) I g�(R) dR - t = 0 
0 
The democratic hypothesis corresponds to m = I. 
-4. listimation Method and Test 
We assume that for each community j the income distributions for 
- j - j
the two types of agents depend only on average incomes R1 , R1 and
standard-errors s : et sJ . 
The model to estimate is then written : 
(2) · T . . -j -j i j i i. · g(hl·(B)l,lil,R 1, R1: N l , N2, S l , Sz , a) = El j = I, . . .  ,J 
I Aboul the need for lhis relationship see Bergstrom and Goodman ( l 973) and for 
critical discussions see Stiglill (197-4). Romer and Rosenthal (1979) and Groves and 
Todo-Rovira (1987). 
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where g is the nonlinear function given in (I), a is the vector of parameters 
. . . . T . . -i - i i( a1 ,a2. P1 1. P 12.v1 .'(2. m). hi is the endogenous variable, (5)1, Iii ·,R 1• R2, N 1 
j j j N2. S 1 . s2 are the e1ogenous variables, and
2 
Ei is an error N(O,oc)
distributed I . 
We use maiimum likelihood estimation. The likelihood function is 
2 
maximized with respect to oc and the concentrated likelihood functiqn
Lc(a) obtained in appendi1 3 is numerically maiimized with respect to a. 
The test of the democratic hypothesis, m = I ,  is realized using the 
estimated asymptotic standard deviation of m's estimator. 
5. Data 
The data which are necessary to estimate the model are the following, 
for each city j. 
I) density functions of income distributions of type I and type 2
agents, 
2) counts of type 1 and type 2 agents,
3) rate (hi) of the "taie d'habitation" and price of housing (pi),
4) values of Bi (the generalized tu base) and Ti(non fiscal resources
of the city), 
5) coefficient Iii.
We were able to get these datas for S 1 observations corresponding to 36 
cities (Toulouse and 35 cities around it) in 1980 and 1 S among them in 
1981. 
S. 1 Distributions of income 
We make the assumption that incomes are log-normally distributed 
- I 2 52 with parameters JL and o2, where JL • Log R - 2 o and o2 
= 
Log(-:- + 1)
R 
where R and s2 are the mean and the variance of incomes, in each
community and each type. 
I Heteroscedastic specifications with rfJ. decreasing with the population size were 
tested but we could not reject homoscedasticity. 
to 
so we need to know the mean and the variance of the income 
distribution for each city and each group of agents I and 2. The French 
fiscal administration gave us R 1 and Rz for each city j and the two
years 1980 and 1981. but S l and S� for Toulouse only and the two
years. We decided to replace the variance of each city and each group by 
the corresponding variance of Toulouse for the same year. 
5.2 Other data. 
We give their basic statistics in the fol1owing table. 
Variables Units Minimum Average Ma1imum Standard- Source 
Error 
-
Rt F 44262.00 66'.'51'.'5.39 1094'.'5'.'5 0 112'.'5911 
R2 F 74372.00 108187.43 1977'.5'.'5.0 20683.39 
N1 count 139 3019.20 98-464 13677.73 
N2 count 18 3'.'52.16 11313 l'.'568.67 
h rate 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.03 
I S ratio 0.004 0.10 0.94 0.16 Bh/N KF -4674.40 6872.86 10006.33 1247.43 
Note I 
Note 2 
Note 3 
Note 4 
1.-"T�/B:::_�_.._r�a�ti�o--'----'0�.0�2 ��0�.�13<--___,'--"-o= .2�9 _,__:.0�.0�7����-"��' 
6. Results 
In table I we give the maximum likelihood estimation of the 
coefficients for different situations. 
I French Ministery of Finance. 
2 Local fiscal administration!. · 3 Local fiscal administration. 
We assume that all the agenl.5 of a same city have the same llj. 
so B· _ ti. x total basis of the "ta1e profe"ionnelle" 
I hi i - i Nz R2 
where ti is the rate of the .. ta1e professionnelle ... hi is the rate of the .. ta1e 
d'ha.hita.tion", N� the number of households of the second group in city j and R � 
the average income of the second group of agents in city ;. 
4 Local fiscal administration. 
Bh is the basis of the "tue d'habitation" . Bb/N, vhere N is the total number of 
households. has been used as a proxy for the price of housing : p. 
t t 
The utility function is defined up to a monotonic increasing 
transformation. Therefore a parameter may be arbitrarily fixed to a non 
zero value ; we choose �12 = 2300. We also set �22 =0 to impose the 
monotonicity of the functions Rt(h) and R2(h) (see appendix I). 
Moreover we have dealt with two specifications for the model. In the 
first one the utility function is that given in section 3 ; '(2 is seen to be non 
significantly different from zero. In the second one '(2 is fixed at zero. 
The fol1owing observations can be made from the table. 
The m coefficient is seen to be significantly different from I for aH 
situations. Therefore, we reject the democratic hypothesis that all agents 
have the same weight in the decision process. 
When the size effect is taken into account by setting : 
Log N m = mo • m1 Log Nma1 
where N is the population size of the city and Nmax the size of the largest 
city in the sample, one can observe that m decreases with the size of the 
city (lines c, e, h). 
These conclusions remain valid when: (i) the property tax, instead of 
being incorporated in the other taxes T, is added to the housing tax for 
every agent (lines f. g, h), (ii) cities with larger S are rejected from the 
sample (line d). Indeed the approximation introduced by expressing the 
trade income tax as part of the income tax ( a S ratio for each community) 
may be hasardous for communities containing a few large firms which 
usually do not play a crucial role in the decisions about local public goods. 
7. Concluding comments
Despite a relatively limited sample we obtain two robust conclusions. 
There appears to be a bias in favor of the agents paying the "taxe 
professionnelle" in the decision process leading to the choice of the level of 
local taxes. Moreover this bias decreases with the size of the city. The 
decrease is sufficiently important so that one city in the sample ( the 
largest) would have an m <1. In that city the weight of each trade income 
tax payer is smaller than that of the pure housing tax payer. 
We think that the estimations of the coefficients in the semi indirect 
utility function are remarkably stable accross our various tests of 
robustness. We should however point out a weakness of the current results. 
According to the theory the semi indirect utility function is decreasing in P 
and this is not always the case. The reason may come from the fact that p 
1 2  
is, in our specification, always associated with ( I  + h ) .  But ( I  + h )  plays 
two opposite roles which create a problem of "identification"'· On the one 
hand h, through its effect on the price of housing, has a negative effect. On 
the other hand, through its effect on the level of public goods, it has a 
positive effect. This "identification problem" affects the coefficients at, p 11. 
P 12 which deter mine also the sign of variation in p. 
We hope to solve this difficulty by the use of a richer data basis. an 
unfortunately unreachable goal now . ·  
I The " " refers 10 the fact that it is not an identification problem asymptotically 
because of the nonlinearity of the model. 
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AppendII t : Monotonic Retalionsblp between 
Incomes and Desired T11 Levels 
Each type of agent obtains his desired level of tax by maximizing with 
respect to h his semi indirect utility function. For an agent i of type 2 
(those who pay the professional tax ) we obtain from the first order 
condition (dropping the index j of the community j ). 
. A (A I . I )  L og  R1 • ....1 2 Bz 
I 
with Az = - � (01 + p 11Log( I +h )p +p 12Log( 1-llh ))
II 
+ l -llh (02 + P 12Log( l +h )p +P22Log{l-llh ))
I - T ("f1• "f2Log (h B +T ))h•s
P12 II B2 - l+h - � P22
For an agent i of type I we obtain : 
(A 1.2) L Ri .Ai og I B1 
where At and Bt are obtained from Az and B2 by setting II - 0 .  
To obtain a one to one relationship between incomes and desired 
levels of tu, it is convenient to impose P22= 0 .  
The first order condition is : 
Ai- B2 Log R = 0 
Hence 
dh B2 I R 
dR = Mz clBz ail"" - ah Log R 
clAz clBz 
with -- - Log R < 0 from the local second order condition of an dh dh 
interior muimum. 
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Hence, under P22=0, the relationship is monotonic for both types of 
agents and the direction of the relationship is determined by the sign of 
P12. These relationships are respectively called Rt(h), Rz(h) in the text. 
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Appendi1 2 : The Litelihood Function 
We give below the likelihood function corresponding to the best 
specification of heteroscedasticity that we found. 
Under the lognormality assumption of income distributions for both 
types of agents the probabilistic model is : 
Ni Log R1(h•i>-µ.i m N� Log R2(h•i)-µ.J 
(A 2.1) . 1 . <t>( ) + . . <t>( ) - -2
1 
= ti
N{•mN� Oj Nf•mN� oz 
where <I> is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal 
. 2 distribution and tJ is N(O, oc>·
(A 2. 1) can be summarized as: 
g(hi,Xi,a) = ti j 
=
 
1 . ... . J 
where hi is the endogenous variable, Xi 
variables and a the vector of parameters. 
the vector of exogenous 
The density function of the endogenous variable h is : 
og 
I oh I t 
f(h) = _ r;:- exp ( - 2 g(h)Z).or·vzn 2o c
I 1. 2 Let q>(x)----c=e -z x .'\/Zn 
Nj ag I Ithen -h = ...'....{ .a OJ NJ1+ m 
16 
. Log R1(hi) - µl 
) dLog R1 (hl) ( qi ------ )+ 
Nj d h OJ 2 
. Log Rz(hi) µ j 
Log Rz(hl) (
- 2) 
d h qi 
dLog RJ(hi) dLog Rz(hi) . . . . where d h and d h are obtained by differentiating (A 1.1) 
and (A 1.2) in appendix I .
2 
O' : r 
The log-likelihood function L is then : 
J 
L
·- �2 2 g(hi)2 (Log 2n or + -2- - 2 Log"r 
j-1 
aL 
By solving 2 = 0 we obtain the maximum likelihood estimator of 
aor 
2 I J . or� T .l,:g(hJ)2.j= 1 
Finally the concentrated log-likelihood function Le is given by : 
J 
J .2 2 � ag . Le - -¥ Log Zn or + 1 - J � Log I ah'hJ )I I
j=l 
This expression is then maximized numerically with respect to a, 
using a quasi-Newton algorithm (routine f04jbf of the NAG library). 
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cq 
a: Every communitr -192'3.7 
vihout size effect 09 
a': Every communitr -3957.7 
vith linear size effect .1."�5..'5 
b: Same as a :  't2" O -214').7 
1flithout size effect l."1 
b · : with linear size -2864.8 
effect. 1.1 
<: : Without largest S -10172.7, 
<:omm unity, 2�'5 
vithout size effect. 
<: : Same as c - -14908.4 
vith linear size effect. 1.7 
e : Every communitr. -2049.') 
"Impot fancier Bati • 1.0 
paid by every one -
"toithout size effect. 
e': Same as e -vith -4009.4 
linear size effect. l.'1 
f: Same as e: V2 = O -1801.l 
vithout size effect. 0.9 
r· : Same as f vith linear -2446.3 
size effect 0.9 
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Table I - · Tt·ans1o g utiHtyt\mction ( 1"112 = 2300) 
cx2 �11 vi Y2 
16819.5 -2765.7 2'38.1 8.75 
:u 107 1.1 0." 
17061.6 -2552.3 747.5 -23.32 
.t.".8 1-5.lk" .1.7 -0.8'1 
16767.7 -2743.7 374.4 0 
'1.0 16.1 1.'!.0 
16796.2 -2667.7 383.8 0 
'12 8..2 108 
23617.5 -1892.3 517.6 0 
6.tf "1.1 10.8 
2256').0 -1363.1 519.4 0 
6.1 . 1..2 10.6 
35043.8 -2728.0 623.0 -9.69 
6.1 9.8 :u 0..'11 
')4663.0 -2523.1 1183.4 -45.7 
1."1 1.2 4."/ 1..'1 
'34931.6 -2756.3 470.8 0 
6.1 9.7 9..'1 
')4447.4 -2683.2 481.8 0 
1.2 81 9.8 
In the estimations we impose cq < 0, �11 < 0, e1,2 an<l \'1 > 0. 
mo 
4.7 
.u 
17.02 
1..12 
4.7 
.2.9 
14.71 
.t.?.9 
6.1 
.t.'"'.9 
18.7 
.1.".l 
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The r-s1ar1�·11":.'J' coi·t·espond to the test with respect to O for a..11 parametei·s end with respect to 1 for mo. 
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